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1. I￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
In the 1950’s and 1960’s, the unemployment rate in both Europe and the U.S. was below
ﬁve percent. During the 1970’s European and U.S. unemployment rates increased sharply
in response to the steep increase in oil prices. In the last two decades, however, unemploy-
ment rates diverged sharply: average European rates have remained high while American
rates have returned once again to prior levels. There are a varietyof institutional factors
distinguishing Europe from the U.S., including strong unions, minimum wages, generous
unemployment beneﬁts, and high employment protection, that might explain diﬀerences in
levels of unemployment. These institutional distinctions have been present throughout the
postwar era, however, and thus theycannot bythemselves explain the diﬀerences in how
unemployment rates have changed. This unexplained divergence between unemployment
rates has been termed the “European unemployment puzzle.”
Recent research has focussed on explaining the puzzle byconsidering the intera ction
between institutions and long-term changes in the economic environment, thought of as
“shocks” to the environment. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), for example, have argued that
a long-term rise in economic turbulence, manifested in greater skill loss for displaced workers,
raises unemployment by a greater amount when unemployment beneﬁts are higher. Increased
turbulence could thus explain whyEurope, with its more generous unemploy ment beneﬁts,
would experience greater increases in unemployment. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) present
empirical evidence relating the behavior of the unemployment rate in several European
countries and the U.S. to the slowdown in TFP growth and higher interest rates. They
show that these factors lead to larger increases in unemployment where institutions are
less “employment-friendly,” as they are in Europe relative to the U.S.. Blanchard and
Wolfers ﬁnd statisticallysigniﬁcant inﬂuence of the following ins titutions: the level of theSHOCKS AND INSTITUTIONS IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 3
replacement rate (the share of income replaced byunemploy ment beneﬁts), the duration of
unemployment beneﬁts, the amount of employment protection, the tax wedge (the diﬀerence
between the real labor cost of a worker to an employer and the real consumption wage of the
worker), the percentage of workers who belong to a union, and the extent to which unions
and employer organizations coordinate wage setting.
Doubt has been expressed in the literature about the importance of some of these insti-
tutions. Nickell and Layard (1999, p. 3030), for example, argue that “time spent worrying
about strict labor market regulations, employment protection, and minimum wages is proba-
bly time largely wasted”. Similarly, Garibaldi (1998) shows that the level of ﬁring restrictions
leaves steadystate unemploy ment rates unaﬀe cted even though it has important (oﬀsetting)
eﬀects on job creation and job destruction. This paper starts, therefore, byconsidering the
interaction between the slowdown in TFP growth and increase in real interest rates (the
shocks) and the level of unemployment beneﬁts. Furthermore, we analyze the interaction
between changes in labor taxation (as a shock) and the initial tax rate (as an institution).1
In this paper we assess the interactions between shocks and institutions using a job
matching model of equilibrium unemployment. Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1994),
job creation and destruction are both determined endogenously, with wages set via bilateral
bargaining within employment relationships.
Comparing steadys tate equilibria, unemployment is shown to increase when either the
growth rate falls, the interest rate increases, or the tax rate on labor income increases.
Moreover, each of these factors leads to a larger rise in unemployment when the replacement
rate is greater or the initial tax rate is higher. Thus, the model exhibits the interaction
1Daveri and Tabellini (2000) also consider the eﬀect of tax rates on unemployment but, as discussed in
section 4.5, the focus of their explanation is quite diﬀerent from ours.SHOCKS AND INSTITUTIONS IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 4
eﬀect found byBlanchard and Wo lfers. Slower growth and higher interest rates lead to
permanent eﬀects on unemployment, since steady state equilibria are aﬀected: as long as
growth remains slow or interest rates remain high, job creation and destruction decisions are
impacted in a manner that raises the equilibrium unemployment rate. This is contrary to
the view of Blanchard and Wolfers and several other economists that productivitygrowth
and interest rates should have onlya transitoryimpact on unemploy ment and should not
aﬀect the natural rate of unemployment.2
Whether the interactions between the institutions and the shocks to the growth, interest,
and tax rates are suﬃcient to quantitativelyexplain both the European and American un-
employment experiences depends crucially on the cross-sectional distribution of productivity
levels. The keyview expressed in this paper is that high replacement rates and high tax
rates increase the mass of jobs that are vulnerable to the type of shocks considered here.
Indeed, it is easyto construct numerical examples where this is the case. The numerical
examples suggest that the variabilityof outcomes at the relationship level, which maybe
tied to factors such as government protection and geographic distance, mayplaya role in
accounting for the European unemployment puzzle. More broadly, our model has the feature
that small changes in the cross-sectional distribution can have important quantitative eﬀects
on equilibrium outcomes. This stands in stark contrast to the recent bodyof work (e.g.,
Krusell and Smith (1998)) that has argued against the quantitative relevance of details of
cross sectional wealth and income distributions in stochastic growth models with partially
uninsurable idiosyncratic risk.
In an extension of our model, we incorporate turbulence. Following Ljungqvist and
2Phelps (1968), Gordon (1997), and Blanchard (2000, p. 257) also claim that the natural rate is not
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Sargent (1998), turbulence is modelled as a positive probabilitythat a high-skilled worker
looses his skills when he is displaced. In our model, a rise in turbulence typically reduces
the level of equilibrium unemployment, contrary to the result of Ljungqvist and Sargent.
As in Ljungqvist and Sargent, turbulence reduces the value of employment relationships
for displaced high-skilled workers, and thus lowers the rate at which new relationships are
formed. The destruction rate is also aﬀected in our model, however: greater turbulence
makes high-skilled workers more reluctant to leave their jobs, and job destruction falls.
On balance, the latter eﬀect tends to dominate and unemployment declines. Although an
increase in turbulence cannot explain the increase in European unemployment rates in the
present setting, allowing for some degree of turbulence does serve to greatlyimprove the
model’s abilityto match the unemploy ment evidence quanti tatively.
Section 2 documents the European unemployment puzzle, Section 3 lays out the model
and Section 4 reports results for parameterized versions of the model. Section 5 concludes.
2. E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ U￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ P￿!!￿￿
In this section we document the time series behavior of variables related to the European
unemployment puzzle for ﬁve European countries (France, Germany, Spain, Italy and the
United Kingdom) and the United States. Standardized unemployment rates are plotted in
Figure 1. As documented bythe ﬁgure, the unemploy ment rates in Europe and the U.S.
were low and fairlysimilar in the beginning of the postwar period. During the 1970’s, un-
employment rates rose both in Europe and the U.S.. After this, however, the unemployment
rate in the U.S. declined, while European unemployment remained high. Accounting for
this diﬀerence, and, in particular, for the persistentlyhigh unemploy ment rates in Europe,
constitutes a puzzle.SHOCKS AND INSTITUTIONS IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 6
One possible explanation is that European institutions mayhave been less fa vorable for
employment. More generous European unemployment beneﬁts, for example, might lead
workers to be more selective in accepting new jobs, thus raising European unemployment
relative to that of the U.S.. Figure 2 plots OECD standardized replacement rates, indicating
that U.S. replacement rates are much lower on average than those in Europe. Note however
that European replacement rates were alreadyhigh relative to U.S. levels at the beginning
of the postwar period, when unemployment rates were similar. Thus, the rise in European
unemployment cannot be explained by changes in European replacement rates.
The numbers in the graph mayseem low. The reason is that the OECD standardized
unemployment rate gives equal weight to the replacement rate in year 1 of an unemployment
spell, to the average replacement rate in years 2 and 3, and to the average replacement rate
for years 4 and 5. Using unequal weighting is unfortunate since the replacement rate during
the ﬁrst year is clearly more important than that during years 4 and 5. We, therefore,
also report in Table 1 the beneﬁt replacement rate and the corresponding beneﬁt duration
measure from Nickell and Layard (1999).
Figure 3 plots the eﬀective tax rate on labor income from Daveri and Tabellini (2000).
Just like replacement rates, labor tax rates cannot byt hemselves account for the dynamic
diﬀerences between European and U.S. unemployment because tax rates were already sub-
stantiallyhigher in Europe in the 1960’s. 3
3Nickell and Layard (1999) point out that the labor market consequences of taxation depend on the sum
of payroll taxes, income taxes, and consumption taxes. In this paper, diﬀerences in the taxation of labor
income and unemployment beneﬁts play a crucial role. This means that diﬀerences in payroll taxes and
diﬀerences in the progressivity of income taxes across countries are important. Nickell and Layard (1999)
show that average payroll taxes for the period from 1989 to 1994 were lower in the US than in all EuropeanSHOCKS AND INSTITUTIONS IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 7
As Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) have stressed, the
diﬀerences between European and U.S. unemployment experiences might best be explained
bythe interaction between institutions and shocks to the economies. Consider, for example,
the behavior of TFP growth and interest rates over the postwar period. Figure 4 docu-
ments a pronounced decline in TFP growth for all of the countries considered, coinciding
roughlywith the increase in unemploy ment. Real interest rates are considered in Figure 5,
where increases over the postwar period maybe observed for everycountrye xcept Germany.
Unemployment responses to the growth slowdown and rise in interest rates appear to vary
based on institutional diﬀerences between countries. Blanchard and Wolfers, in particular,
provide evidence that where institutions are less employment-friendly, e.g., where replace-
ment rates are higher, unemployment rises by a greater amount in the face of slower growth
and higher real interest rates. In the remainder of this paper we assess the extent to which an
equilibrium job market matching model can rationalize these observed interactions between
institutions and unemployment responses.
3. M￿￿￿￿
In this section we present the model. Sections 3.1 through 3.4 describe the version of the
model in which there is no growth and no turbulence. In Section 3.5 we show that adding
disembodied growth is equivalent to an adjustment of the discount factor in the model with
no growth. In Sections 3.6 we introduce turbulence.
3.1. Employment Relationships. Production takes place within employment relation-
ships consisting of one worker and one ﬁrm, who interact through discrete time until the
relationship is severed or the worker retires. A relationship produces output z per period.
countries considered in this paper except the UK.SHOCKS AND INSTITUTIONS IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 8
When a relationship is ﬁrst formed, the initial value of z is drawn from the distribution ν(z).
For a continuing relationship, the value of z mayvaryas a consequence of relationship-
speciﬁc productivityshocks that occur at the start of a period. We consider two kinds of
productivityshocks.
(1) With probability γS there is a switch of the productivityl evel z. I nt h i sc a s e ,z is
drawn again from the distribution ν(z). If no switch occurs, then the relationship maintains
the previous period value of z.
(2) With probability ρx the relationship experiences an exogenous breakup, where sev-
erance occurs automatically. Exogenous breakups reﬂect events that permanently destroy
the productivityof the relationship; e.g., market conditions mayshift adversely . Alterna-
tively, exogenous breakups can capture changes in workers’ personal circumstances that lead
them to change jobs. Assume that exogenous separations cannot occur in the period that a
relationship is newlyformed.
After the current-period productivityparam eter is determined, the worker and ﬁrm de-
cide whether to continue or sever their relationship, and, if the relationship is continued,
theydetermine the worker’s wage pay ment. Wages are set according to Nash bargaining,
where π gives the worker’s bargaining weight, and the disagreement point is severance of the
relationship. In addition, workers are subject to shocks that induce retirement, occurring
at the end of a period. Let ρr denote the probabilityof retirement. If the worker and ﬁrm
agree to sever their relationship following a switch, or if exogenous separation occurs, then
theyeach enter a matching market in which new employ ment relationships are formed. A
retiring worker, in contrast, leaves the labor market and obtains a future value of zero.SHOCKS AND INSTITUTIONS IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 9
3.2. Matching Market. New employment relationships are formed on a matching mar-
ket. Each period, the number of newlyformed relationships is m(u,v), where u and v give
the masses of unemployed workers and ﬁrms posting vacancies, respectively. We assume
that m(u,v) is a homogeneous function of degree 1 and that the total masses of workers and
ﬁrms are ﬁxed at unity. Because the mass of workers is equal to the mass of ﬁrms, the ratio
of the mass of unemployed to the mass of vacancies and, thus, the matching probability are
ﬁxed. Each period, a proportion ρr of the workers leaves the market through retirement,
replaced byan iden tical number of new entrant workers that ﬂow into the unemployment
pool. Further, established workers enter the unemployment pool when their employment
relationships are severed.
While theyare unemploy ed, workers receive unemploy ment beneﬁts equal to b. To sim-
plifythe analy sis, we assume that beneﬁts are linked to average wages of all workers. Unem-
ployed workers thus obtain a per period beneﬁt of b = φp while unemployed, where p denotes
the mean wage payment of all workers. New entrant workers do not receive unemployment
beneﬁts.
3.3. Zero SurplusLevel. Newly-matched workers and ﬁrms choose to accept their
match and begin an employment relationship if their initial productivity draw z is suﬃciently
high. Correspondingly, a worker and ﬁrm in an ongoing relationship choose to continue their
relationship following a switch if the new draw of z is suﬃcientlyhigh. We assume that the
worker and ﬁrm bargain eﬃcientlyover the terms of their relationship, and thus theymake
acceptance and continuation decisions that maximize their joint surplus. Joint surplus is
deﬁned as follows. Let z denote the current value productivityparameter following any
productivitydraw, and suppose the worker obtains unemploy ment beneﬁt b each period heSHOCKS AND INSTITUTIONS IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 10
is in the worker matching pool. Then joint surplus is given by
s(z,b)=( 1−τe(z))z + g(z) −(1 − τu(b))b− w
w(b) − w
f, (1)
where g(z) denotes the future joint value from continuing the relationship, ww(b) denotes the
worker’s future value from entering the unemployment pool in the current period when he
receives an unemployment beneﬁt of b, wf indicates the ﬁrm’s future value from entering the
vacancypool in the current period, τe(x) is the tax rate on income earned in the relationship
when income is equal to x and τu(x) is the tax rate on unemployment beneﬁts equal to x.
In equilibrium, s(z,b) is an increasing function of z ( a sl o n ga sτe(x) does not increase
too sharplywith x), and there exists a zero surplus level z(b) indicating the smallest value
of z at which accepting or continuing the relationship yields nonzero surplus to the worker
and ﬁrm. For values of z below z(b), the worker and ﬁrm will either reject a new match,
or theywill destroyan existing match. The zero surplus level is deﬁned bythe following
condition:
s(z(b),b)=0 . (2)
3.4. Equilibrium. The equilibrium conditions, involving equilibrium values of g(z) and
w(b), equilibrium wage payments, and steady state conditions for the matching market, are
given as follows. The future joint value from continuing a relationship is equal to 4
4This formula holds for values of z ≥ z(φp). A match with a worker that is not entitled to unemployment
beneﬁts would be willing to produce for values of z lower than z(φp) but higher than z(0) to become entitled
to unemployment beneﬁts. For the values of z for which such an “entitlement eﬀect” occurs, the relationship

















The Nash bargaining solution implies that the wage payment to a worker having current
unemployment beneﬁt b, written p(z,b), satisﬁes the following condition:
p(z,b)+g
w(z)=πs(z,b)+( 1− τu(b))b + w
w(b), (4)
































w = m(u,v)/u denotes the worker matching probability.
Let u(b) denote the mass of workers in the unemployment pool at the end of a period,
having unemployment beneﬁt b. The probabilitythat a ﬁrm in the vacancypool matches



















Let e denote the total mass of employed workers in continuing employment relationships
at the start of a period prior to realization of productivityshocks. Steadystate c onditionsSHOCKS AND INSTITUTIONS IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 12
for worker stocks and ﬂows are given as follows. The stocks u(0) and u(φp) of new entrants
and workers previouslyemploy ed, respe ctively, must satisfy
ρ
r = ρ
ru( 0 )+( 1− ρ
r)λ













w(1 − ν(z(φp))u(φp), (9)
where gross inﬂows are given on the left-hand sides of the equations, and gross outﬂows on
the right-hand sides. Observe in (9) that workers never ﬂow directlyfrom the u(0) pool to
the u(φp) pool, since theymust spend at least one period in the e pool to qualityfor beneﬁts
φp. The stock e is determined by
(1 − ρ
r)λ
w [(1 − ν(z(0))u( 0 )+( 1− ν(z(φp))u(φp)]
= ρ









We assume that the government uses tax revenues to ﬁnance unemployment beneﬁts
and the purchases of commodities. Below we let ζ denote the per capita value of these
government purchases. We introduce this term to studytax rates that are not related to
ﬁnancing requirements of unemployment beneﬁts. Let e(b) denote the mass of employed
workers that would be entitled to unemployment beneﬁts b after displacement. The budget
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3.5. Growth and Interest Rates. We assume that output within a relationship is equal
to (1 + ξ)
t z per period, where ξ is the growth rate. Output, thus, displays disembodied
deterministic technological growth. We also assume that households are risk neutral and
discount future earnings using the interest rate r. The model outlined above is consistent
with the presence of growth, since the parameter β can be reinterpreted to capture the
growth eﬀect when ξ ￿=0 . In particular, β =( 1+ξ)/(1 + r).
This discount factor would also be appropriate under more general assumptions about
preferences. Suppose that households pool their labor and proﬁt incomes at the end of each
period and choose aggregate consumption to maximize the discounted utilityof a represen-
tative household using the composite discount factor δ =( 1− ρr)/(1 + ρ), which combines
the retirement parameter, ρr, with the conventional discount factor, 1/(1+ρ). Interest rates
are determined bythe following equation:
(1 + r)δMt+1 =1 , (12)
where Mt+1 is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption this period and next
period.
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Note that using δMt+1 to discount (1 + ξ)z is equivalent to using (1 + ξ)δMt+1 to discount
z. The relationship between ξ and Mt+1 depends cruciallyon assumptions about the utility
function. The asset-pricing literature has shown that standard assumptions about prefer-
ences cannot explain average real interest rates.5 A related problem of standard preferences
is that the predicted eﬀect of ξ on r is inconsistent with the data.6 Note, however, that
irrespective of the particular speciﬁcation for preferences, optimizing behavior pins down
the “growth-adjusted” discount factor at




Instead of trying to solve the diﬃcult question of how ξ aﬀects Mt+1, this equation suggest
that one maysimplyuse observed growth and interest rates to infer the appropriate eﬀ ective
discount factor. This is the approach followed in this paper.7
3.6. Turbulence. In this subsection we distinguish between low-skilled and high-skilled
workers. This allows us to analyze the turbulence eﬀect of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998).
Theyargue that the Eur opean unemployment puzzle can be explained by the interaction
between high replacement rates, on one hand, and an increase in the probabilitythat an
5See, for example, Weil (1992).
6For example, the CRRA preferences used above imply that a decrease in the growth rate should lower real
interest rates, while in Section 2 we documented that the observed decrease in TFP growth rates coincided
with an increase in real interest rates.
7Taking the interest rate would be appropriate if one thinks of the matching model as a partial equilibrium
model. For example, the model can be viewed as being relevant for those sectors for which growth can be
characterized as disembodied. We are sympathetic to this view, since one could very well argue that growth
in some sectors is better described as embodied growth. We discuss embodied growth in more detail in
Section 4.5.SHOCKS AND INSTITUTIONS IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 15
unemployed skilled worker cannot ﬁnd a job in which he can use his acquired skills, on the
other. Unemployed workers who had previously earned high wages, and are thus entitled
to high unemployment beneﬁts, thus, become more likely to receive low wage oﬀers. The
corresponding increase in the rejection rate of job oﬀers would then lead to an increase
in the unemployment rate. As in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) we capture an increase
in turbulence byan increased probabilitythat a high-skilled worker becomes a low-skilled
worker.
It is interesting to analyze an increase in turbulence in our framework because it diﬀers
in two important aspects from the framework of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998). First, we
allow for endogenous wage setting between the worker and the employer, meaning that the
worker can bargain for a higher wage instead of simplyhaving a choice between re jecting or
accepting the employer’s wage oﬀer. Second, in contrast to Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998),
the breakup decision in our model is not exogenous, but is allowed to varyin response to
changes in the economic environment. The view that employees are likely to change their
behavior is clearlyformulated byAlan Greenspan in the following quote: “ But the sense of
increasing skill obsolescence has also led to an apparent willingness on the part of employees
to forgo wage and beneﬁt increases for increased job security. Thus, despite the incredible
tightness of labor markets, increases in compensation per hour have continued to be relatively
modest.” 8
The current-period skill level of a particular worker is denoted by k, and the high and
low skill levels are given by h and l, respectively. Unemployed workers obtain a per period
beneﬁt of bk = φpk where pk denotes the mean wage payment of all skill k workers. When a
8Alan Greenspan in ”Is there a new economy?: The eﬀect of human psychology on the market.” Vital
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relationship is ﬁrst formed with a worker having skill level k, the initial value of z is drawn
from the distribution νk(z). Assume νh(z) >ν l(z); i.e., the high-skill distribution ﬁrst-order
stochasticallydominates the low-skill distribution. In addition to the probabilityof a switch
and an exogenous breakup, the relationship with a low-skilled worker can now also receive
an upgrade at the beginning of the period, wherein he receives a draw from νh(z).9
High-skilled workers who become unemployed will become low skilled with probability γD.
The keyfeature of the model with turbulence is, thus, that there are low-skilled unemploy ed
workers with a high level of unemployment beneﬁts bh.
Adjusting the equations is reasonablystraightforward. The surplus equation for a high-
skilled worker is now given by:




where the subscripts h and l denote the skill level of the worker. The zero surplus level is
deﬁned bythe following condition:
sk(zk(b),b)=0 . (16)
In the model without turbulence (γD =0 ) the value of zl is the same for those workers
who receive a switch and for the unemployed who enter a new relationship, because both
are entitled to bl.10 In the model with turbulence, however, the zero surplus level for the
9We assume that workers experiencing an upgrade must work for at least one period at the high skill level
in order to qualify for the beneﬁt bh. To reduce the number of diﬀerent worker classiﬁcations we assume
that in case of an upgrade a worker receives a draw of z in the range of values where an existing relationship
with a high-skilled worker who is entitled to bh would not break up.
10Note that this is not true for the (small number of) new labor market entrants who are not yet entitled
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unemployed with high unemployment beneﬁts, zl(bh) will be higher than the zero surplus
level for the unemployed with low unemployment beneﬁts, zl(bl). Note that the latter zero
surplus level still equals that of the low-skilled workers who receive a switch.
The equilibrium conditions are modiﬁed as follows. The continuation values for the













































Equations (4), (5) and (6) are changed in a similar way. For γD > 0, there is a nonnegligible
stock ul(bh) of workers who have low skills but obtain the high unemployment beneﬁt on the
basis of their previous job. To calculate average wages (and, thus, unemployment beneﬁts)
and taxes one needs a precise diﬀerentiation of the diﬀerent groups, since not all workers
with the same skill level earn the same wage and operate at the same range of values for z.
In particular, in the model with turbulence there are four diﬀerent types of unemployed and
six diﬀerent types of employed workers (see the appendix for details).11
11This makes the complete set of transition equations somewhat tedious. Details of the transition equations
are available on request.SHOCKS AND INSTITUTIONS IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 18
4. S￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ U￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ R￿￿￿￿
The goal of this section is to document that the model outlined in Section 3 can explain
the divergent behavior of European and U.S. unemployment rates when key aspects of the
economic environment deteriorate. To accomplish this, we will show that a decrease in
the growth rate, an increase in the interest rate, as well as an increase in the tax rate (the
shocks considered) lead to a higher steadystate unemploy ment rate. Further, the magnitude
of the eﬀect can be small at low initial tax rates and replacement rates (the institutions),
but substantial at high initial tax rates and replacement rates. The idea is that the steady
state values corresponding with the favorable economic environment capture the average
values of the unemployment rate during the 1950’s and 1960’s, and the steady state values
corresponding to the unfavorable economic environment reﬂect the average values of the
unemployment rate during the 1980’s and 1990’s. The 1970’s represent a transition period
that we will not tryto model.
In Section 4.1, we give the basic intuition behind our storyand illustrate it using several
numerical examples that document the interaction between the reduction in the discount
factor and the level of unemployment beneﬁts. In Section 4.2, we show that the same
idea applies to changes in tax rates on labor income. In Section 4.3, we demonstrate that an
increase in turbulence is not a good candidate to explain the European unemployment puzzle
in this framework, when an increase in turbulence is modelled as an increased probability
of skill loss after job separation. In Section 4.4, we emphasize the importance of the cross-
sectional distribution of productivityshocks and in Section 4.5 we discuss related literature.
4.1. Implications of Shocks in the Benchmark Model. In this section we study
the eﬀect of changes in the growth rate and the interest rate on steadystate unemploy mentSHOCKS AND INSTITUTIONS IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 19
rates.
Intuition. In Section 3.5, it was established that the appropriate discount factor in
a model with disembodied growth is equal to (1 + ξ)/(1 + r). Figure 6 plots the scaled
values of (1 +ξ)/(1 +r) for ﬁve-year intervals. The graph clearly shows that combining the
growth eﬀect and the real interest rate eﬀect, one observes for each countrya decrease in
the transformed discount factor. We will start byinvestigating the eﬀect of changes in this
discount factor on the steadystate unemploy ment rate and the interaction with the level of
the replacement rate.
Consider again the equation that determines the zero surplus level.
z + g(z) −b − w(b)=0 . (19)
To simplifythe notation we have set tax rates to zero. A decrease in the discount factor
will decrease both g(z) and w(b). The question is which one will decrease more. If g(z)
is equal to w(b), then it is not hard to show that there will be no eﬀect on z.I f g(z) is
bigger than w(b), then a decrease in the discount factor, not surprisingly, will have a bigger
impact on g(z) than on w(b), thus increasing z. The value of g(z) will be bigger than w(b),
and z will be smaller than b, when the probabilityof receiving a switch, γS, is higher than
the matching probabilityfor an unemploy ed worker, λ. The intuition for this last result
is relativelysimple. The idea is that when γS >λrelationships staytogether at values
of z that are somewhat less than b because bystay ing together theyhave a better chance
of quicklyincreasing their earnings. We ﬁnd it implausible that the best wayto increase
productivityis to end the relationship, and therefore, the natural case to consider is the one
where γS >λand g(z) is bigger than w(b). Thus, a decrease in the discount factor increases
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breakup probabilityof workers within a relationship.
Graphically, this idea is captured in Figure 7, which show how the surplus changes in
response to a decrease in the discount factor. A shift to a low growth (or high interest rate)
economylowers the joint surplus, raising both the rejection probabilityfor new matches
and the destruction probabilityfor ongoing ones. Thus, the ﬂow out of the unemploy ment
pool is reduced, while the ﬂow into the pool is increased, leading to the robust prediction
of a higher steady-state unemployment rate. Further, an increase in the replacement rate,
φ, also shifts joint surplus downward, raising the rejection and destruction probabilities.
We will show below that the eﬀects of lower β and higher φ are complementary, causing
a decline in β to have a bigger eﬀect when φ is large. It should be stressed that slower
growth and higher interest rates lead to permanent changes in unemployment, based on the
fact that unemployment is determined in steady state equilibrium. This contrasts with the
conjecture of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), who argue that the shocks aﬀect unemployment
in a transitoryway . As long as β remains low, however, the zero surplus level continues to
be high, and high levels of unemployment are maintained.
Benchmark Parameterization. This eﬀect maybe illustrated using some numerical
examples. The distribution ν(z) is taken to be uniform with support [ν,ν], while the match-
ing probabilityis ﬁxed. Periods are taken to be quarters. Table 2 reports numerical values
of the parameters for our benchmark speciﬁcation.
Results for the benchmark parameterization are given in part A of Table 3, which reports
for a low- and a high-replacement-rate economythe equilibrium unemploy ment rates for
various values of the discount factor β. Note that the low- and the high-replacement-rate
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table, a decline in growth or a rise in the interest rate, both reﬂected bya fall in the
discount factor β, lead to higher unemployment rates for high levels of the replacement rate
φ. At low values of φ, however, there is no rise in unemployment associated with a fall in
β. The model, therefore, exhibits an interaction between shocks and institutions, whereby
higher replacement rates exacerbate the unemployment eﬀects of either a growth slowdown
or a rise in interest rates. The keyas pect of this parameterization is displayed in Figure
8, which plots the cross-sectional distribution of productivityvalues z, along with the zero
surplus levels. The ﬁgure captures our basic believe that at high replacement rates, the mass
of jobs sensitive to deteriorations in the economic environment is bigger.
Note that in the high-replacement-rate economy , onlythe lowest productivityjobs are
destroyed. The average productivity of ongoing relationships will, therefore, increase in
the high-replacement-rate economyrelative to the low-replacement-rate economy . 12 This
is consistent with Nickell and Lay ard (1999), who document that labor productivityhas
increased in Europe relative to the U.S..
Duration and Flows Into and Out of Unemployment. In several European coun-
tries, the fraction of long-term unemployed has increased in the last few decades.13 Moreover,
Machin and Manning (1999) argue that the rise in the incidence of long-term unemployment
is mainlydue to a decrease in the ﬂows out of unemploy ment. To understand the relevance
of these observations for our model, consider the following steadystate expression for the
12The increase in average productivity leads to an increase in average wages and, thus, an increase in
unemployment beneﬁts. This increase in unemployment beneﬁts leads to a further increase in the unem-
ployment rate. The eﬀect is quantitatively, however, very small and the overall increase in the unemployment
rate would be similar if the value of b is kept constant.





D(1 − u), (20)
where ρR is the rejection rate and ρD is the destruction rate (here we have abstracted from
retirement and new entrants, which do not playan important role in the numerical exercises).
In our model, ρR is equal to ρD (except for new entrants), so it mayseem that our f ramework
is not consistent with the observation made byMachin and Manning (1999). Moreover, it
might seem diﬃcult to generate realistic increases in the outﬂow rate λ
w(1 − ρR) with a
constant matching probability.
Because of composition eﬀects, however, our mechanism is consistent with a substantial
increase in the average duration of unemployment, a substantial decrease in the average
outﬂow rate of unemployment, and a modest increase in the average outﬂow rate of em-
ploy ment. To clarifythis statement, consider the following example of an economywith two
types of workers: type A and type B. For simplicity we assume that workers never switch
type;14 this means that both types operate with complete independence. Suppose that jobs
of type A workers are destroyed with probability equal to 0.1 and that jobs of type B work-
ers are destroyed with probability equal to 0.02. According to our model, these are also the
rejection rates of new job oﬀers. Furthermore, assume that the mass of type A workers is
equal to 0.1, the mass of type B workers is equal to 0.9, the matching probability for a type
A worker is equal to 0.3 and the matching probabilityfor a ty pe B worker is equal to 0.8.
Then it is straightforward to calculate that the steady state unemployment rate is equal to
4.94%, that the outﬂow rate of unemployment is equal to 50.3% and that the outﬂow rate
14Recall that in the turbulence version of the model we allow workers to switch types, and in Section 4.3
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of employment is equal to 2.61%. Now suppose that in response to a deterioration of the
economic environment the destruction rate of type A workers increases from 0.1 to 0.4, while
the destruction rate of type B workers remains unchanged. This increases the unemployment
rate from 4.94% to 9.14%. Note that for type A workers there is a substantial increase in the
outﬂow rate of employment. The average outﬂow rate of employment, however, increases
onlyfrom 2.61% to 3.3% because the number of employ ed ty pe A workers decreases relative
to the number of employed type B workers. In the unemployment pool, the fraction of type
A workers, i.e. the workers with high unemployment duration, increases. This results in a
substantial decrease in the outﬂow rate of unemployment and a substantial increase in the
average unemployment duration. Speciﬁcally, the average unemployment duration increases
from 2.6 to 4.5 periods.
Alternative Parameterizations. An important feature of the benchmark parame-
terization is that the value of z is not in the support of the distribution ν(z) for the high
discount factor case for both the low- and the high-replacement-rate economy. Suppose in-
stead that we increase the support of z such that there are endogenous breakups during the
favorable, i.e. high β, period. If we keep the rate of exogenous breakups, ρx, the same then
unemployment rates across the high-replacement-rate and the low-replacement-rate economy
would not be equal during the favorable times. We consider two alternatives to deal with
this. In the ﬁrst, the rate of exogenous breakups, ρx, is higher in the low-replacement-rate
economy, and in the second, the standard deviation of z is higher in the low-replacement-rate
economy.
When one thinks of the low-replacement-rate economyas the U.S., then these speciﬁca-
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for personal reasons are more likelyto lead to job termination in the U.S. than in Europe.
The presence of government subsidies could also trim the low side of the distribution in Eu-
rope. There are some empirical observations consistent with these conjectures. Nickell and
Layard (1999), for example, document that regional mobility has been substantiallyhigher
in the U.S. than in most European countries. For the period from 1980 to 1987, for example,
an average of 2.9% of all workers changed region each year in the U.S., while for the ﬁve
European countries considered in this paper the highest percentage was observed for France,
at only1.3%. 15Also important in this respect are the observations from Nickell and Layard
(1999) about minimum wages. They report that the minimum wage relative to the country’s
average wage over the period from 1991 to 1994 was substantiallyhigher in Sweden than in
the U.S., but in Sweden no workers were at or near the minimum wage while in the U.S.
four percent of the workers were at or near the minimum wage. In Spain, however, more
workers were at the minimum wage even though the minimum wage in Spain was lower.
Results for Alternative Parameterizations. In the ﬁrst alternative considered, we
set the rate of exogenous breakups, ρx, in the high-replacement-rate economyequal to zero
and choose the support of the distribution such that the unemployment rate in the high-
replacement-rate economyis again equal to (approximately ) 5% when β =0 .99, i.e., the value
corresponding to the favorable growth and interest rate regime. The results for this case are
reported in the ﬁrst two columns of part B of Table 3 for the high- and the low-replacement-
rate economy, respectively. For the low-replacement-rate economy the zero surplus level is
still outside the support of the distribution, and changes in the discount factor have no eﬀect
on the breakup and rejection margin. The keyidea of this parameterization is graphically
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presented in Figure 9.
In the second alternative, the support of z in the economywith a low replacement rate is
set such that the unemployment rate is equal to 5% when β =0 .99 and the rate of exogenous
destruction equal zero. Obviouslythe support for z will then be wider in the economywith
a low replacement rate. The results for the low-replacement-rate economyare reported in
the third column of part B of Table 3. When we compare the third column with the ﬁrst
column, then we see that unemployment rates actually increase more in the low-replacement-
rate economy. This despite the fact that the mass of jobs just to the right of z is larger in
the high-replacement-rate economy. There is a stronger response to the level of z in the
high-replacement-rate economy, however, because z −b is lower in the low-replacement-rate
economy, leading to a higher level of g(z) − w. As pointed out before, the higher g(z) − w,
the higher the eﬀect of changes in β on z.
Note that the matching probabilities are assumed to be equal across economies. But du-
ration of unemployment has been much lower in the U.S. then in Europe,16 so it makes sense
to use a higher matching probabilityin the low-replacement-rate economy . In particular, we
increase the matching probabilityin the low-replacement-rate economyfrom 0.3 to 0.5 and
repeat the last experiment. The results in the fourth column of part B of Table 3 show that
the increase in the matching probabilityreduces the sensitivityof the unemploy ment rate
to a change in the discount factor, bydecreasing the value of g(z) − w. In fact, when we
compare the ﬁrst and the fourth column we see that the unemployment rate is again more
sensitive to changes in the discount factor in the high-replacement rate economy.
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4.2. Shocks to Tax Rates in the Benchmark Model. In this section we discuss
the eﬀects of diﬀerential tax rates for labor income and unemployment beneﬁts on the
unemployment rate. It is easy to show that when tax rates are proportional and equal
for both forms of income, tax rates have no eﬀect on unemployment in our framework.
Because of the presence of payroll taxes and progressive income taxes, however, this is not
an empiricallyrelevant case. In general the tax rate on labor income will be higher than the
tax rate on unemployment beneﬁts. The eﬀects of tax rates on unemployment are similar
to the eﬀects of the discount rate on unemployment. Just like a reduction in the discount
factor, an increase in the tax rate diﬀerential increases the zero surplus level. This has
important consequences for the unemploy ment rate onlyif manyjobs are aﬀected bythe
increase. When most jobs have surplus values that are considerablyabove zero the increase
in z will be unimportant. A low initial tax level, just like a low replacement rate, can ensure
that most jobs have surplus levels that are high enough to be safe from increases in tax rates.
Since onlydiﬀerences between the tax rate on labor income and the tax rate on un-
employment beneﬁts matter in our model, we will normalize tax rates bys etting the tax
rate on unemployment beneﬁts, τu(b), equal to zero. Moreover, we assume that positive
proﬁts are taxed at a constant rate and no tax credits are given for negative proﬁts, that is,
τz(z)=τz > 0 for z > 0 and τz(z)=0for z < 0.
Part A of Table 4 shows the steadystate unemploy ment rates for diﬀerent values of the
discount factor and diﬀerent values of ζ, the level of per capita government purchases relative
to the mean value of z. We consider values of ζ equal to 0, 0.25, and 0.5. The empirical
literature has mainlyfocused on tax rates. In our framework, the tax rate is an endogenous
variable inﬂuenced bythe level of unemploy ment beneﬁts, the number of unemploy ed workers
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model onlythrough changes in tax r ates, changes in ζ are the cleanest wayto evaluate
the eﬀect of changes in tax rates. Note that it makes no sense to consider larger values of
government expenditures since we have used the normalization that τu =0 . We set the value
of φ equal to 0.5. The ﬁrst column in part A of Table 4, corresponding to the case where per
capita government expenditures are equal to zero, is identical to the second column in part
A of Table 3. In this case taxes are onlyused to ﬁnance unemploy ment beneﬁts. We see
that an increase in tax rates (caused byan increase in government expenditures) increases
the steadystate unemploy ment rate. The results in Part B correspond to the same exercise
when the initial level of government expenditures is higher. In particular, while for part A
the support of the distribution was chosen in such a waythat the unemploy ment rate equals
5% when β =0 .99 and ζ =0 , for part B the support of the distribution was calibrated
such that the unemployment rate equals 5% when β =0 .99 and ζ =0 .10. We clearlysee
that an increase in the tax rate has a bigger impact when the initial tax rate is higher.17
In particular, starting at ζ =0a ﬁve percentage point increase in per capita expenditures
increases the unemployment rate from 5% to 6.24%, while the same percentage point change
starting at ζ =0 .10 increases the unemployment rate from 5% to 7.32%. Also note that
the combined change in the discount factor and the tax rate leads to substantial changes in
steadystate unemployment rates.
17One could argue that it would be better to ensure that the percentage change in 1-ζ is the same for part
A and B of Table 4. The value of 1-ζ drops 5% (from 1 to 0.95) in part A. An equal percentage decrease in
the value of 1-ζ in part B requires a reduction in 1-ζ from 0.9 to 0.855 or an increase in ζ from 0.10 to 0.145,
slightly less than the increase to 0.15 considered. The results for the increase in ζ to 0.145 are, however,
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4.3. Shocks in the Presence of and to Turbulence. We now consider the extension
of the model that includes two skill levels and turbulence. In a turbulent economy, high-
skilled workers mayface a loss of skills if theylose their jobs, because of skill obsolescence
or diﬃcultyof ﬁnding a new job in the s ector for which their skills are specialized. Fol-
lowing Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), we model turbulence byassuming that high-skilled
workers who separate from an employment relationship suﬀer a downgrade to low skills with
probability γD. The previous version of the model, in which γD =0 , maybe viewed as a
“tranquil” economyin which skills never become obsol ete. Greater degrees of turbulence are
reﬂected byhigher values of γD. The parameters for the economies with turbulence are given
in Table 5. In the economywith a high replacement rate, exogenous destruction is set equal
to zero and the support of z is chosen in such a waythat for β =0 .99 and γD =0 .10 (the
favorable regime values) the unemployment rate is equal to 5%. In the low-replacement-rate
economy, all parameters are identical except the replacement rate and the level of exoge-
nous destruction, which is increased to obtain a 5% unemployment rate for β =0 .99 and
γD =0 .10.
The steadystate une mployment rates for diﬀerent values of the discount factor and the
turbulence parameter are reported in parts A and B of Table 6 for the high- and the low-
replacement-rate economy, respectively. In part B we see that the low-replacement-rate
economyis still far enough awayfrom the zero surplus level of z and is not aﬀected by
changes in the discount factor or the turbulence parameter. Two important observations
can be made concerning the results for the high-replacement-rate economy. The ﬁrst is
that in contrast to Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), an increase in turbulence decreases the
unemployment rate. The reason is related to the aspect of turbulence that Alan Greenspan
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(that is, an increased probabilityof skill loss), high-skilled workers are less likelyto quit
their job. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) ﬁx the rate of destruction and do not consider a
response in the destruction rate to a change in the economic environment. In our model an
increase in turbulence does increase the rejection rate of the unemployed, because a rise in
turbulence increases the fraction of unemployed workers entitled to unemployment beneﬁts
that are high relative to wage oﬀers received. This eﬀect, however, is dominated bythe
increased willingness of high-skilled workers to hold on to their jobs.
A second observation is that in the presence of turbulence, the impact of a change in
the discount factor on the unemployment rate is substantially higher, due to a composition
eﬀect. A decrease in the discount factor not onlyincreases the destruction rate for each skill
level, but it also increases the fraction of low-skilled workers. Since low-skilled workers have
higher destruction rates, unemployment rates rise even further. This composition eﬀect is
stronger for lower values of the upgrade probability, γU. This can be seen in part C of Table
6, which corresponds to part A except that γU is now equal to 0.10 instead of 0.15.18 We see
that a decrease of the discount factor from 0.99 to 0.97 would increase the unemployment
rate from 5% to 23% and even if we allow for an increase in turbulence (γD increases from
0.10 to 0.15) the unemployment rate would still increase from 5% to 18.5%.
When γU is equal to 0.1, the unemployment rates in the low-replacement-rate economy
are aﬀected bythe decrease in the discount factor, although the eﬀect is verysmall. This
is documented in part D of Table 6. Starting at values of β =0 .99 and γD =0 .10, a
decrease in β to 0.97 would increase the unemployment rate from 5% to 5.6%. Note that
at this point, an increase in γD to 0.15 would increase the unemployment rate slightly, to
18In addition, the standard deviation is recalibrated to obtain a ﬁve percent unemployment rate in the
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5.7%. The main reason whyan increase in turbulence increases the unemploy ment rate in
the low-replacement-rate economyis not because of the eﬀect proposed byLjungqvist and
Sargent (that there are more unemployed workers with beneﬁts that are high relative to
the wage oﬀers their skills can generate). The quantitatively more important eﬀect is that
turbulence decreases the outside option for high-skilled workers and, thus, lowers the wages
of high-skilled workers. This implies a reduction in future wages of low-skilled workers and
thus a decrease in relationship beneﬁts for low-skilled workers. This reduction implies an
increases in their zero surplus level.19
Turbulence and the eﬀect on unemployment rates?. The question arises whether
in realitythe eﬀect of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) is alway s dominated bya reduction in
the breakup probabilityof high-skilled workers. In our numerical examples we ty picallyfound
numericallyinsigniﬁcant eﬀ ects from increases in the rejection rates bythe une mployed,
because the mass of unemployed is relatively small. For example, suppose that the matching
probabilityis equal to 50% and that both the destruction rate and the rejection rate of new
job oﬀers is equal to 2.56%. Then it is easyto calculate that the steadystate une mployment
rate would be equal to 5%. To get an increase of the unemployment rate to 10% one would
have to increase the rejection rate to 53.8%, while one onlyhas to increase the destru ction
rate to 0.054% to get the same increase in the unemployment rate.20 Also, a problematic
observation for the explanation given byLjungqvist and Sargent (1998) is that most of the
increase in European unemployment rates is due to an increase of the unemployment of
19The quantitative importance of this eﬀect is still small. For this eﬀect to be quantitatively important,
one needs a large mass of low-skilled workers, that is, a low value of γU. But when γU is low, changes in
wages earned after an upgrade occurs are not very important.
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workers with low skill levels.21
There actuallyis a more robust wayto increase turbulence. Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999) model an increase in turbulence as an increase in the cross-sectional variation of
z. Table 7 reports steadystate unemploy ment rates for diﬀerent values of β and the cross-
sectional variation of z in the high-replacement-rate economyand documents that an increase
in turbulence now leads to a substantial increase in the steadystate unemploy ment rate.
4.4. Empirical Relevance and the Importance of Cross-Sectional Data. We have
generated numerical examples in which unemployment rates in the low-replacement-rate
economydo not respond to a deterioration of the economy , but unemploy ment rates in the
high-replacement-rate economydo. In the benchmark parameterization, in which there are
no endogenous breakups in the favorable regime, this was accomplished using two economies
that are identical except for the replacement rate. In the alternative parameterizations, the
same eﬀects are possible when there are endogenous breakups, but now the two economies
have to diﬀer in more than just the replacement rate. The keyhy pothesis in this paper
is that the mass of jobs that were close to breaking up was substantiallyhigher in Europe
because of high tax rates and high outside beneﬁts. In Section 2 we documented that tax
rates and unemployment beneﬁts are higher in Europe. But if Europe is more productive
than the U.S., then European surplus values are not necessarilylower. To shed some light
on this question, we plot in Figure 10 net proﬁt rates in the manufacturing sector in the
U.S. and Europe. The ﬁgure documents that in the earlypostwar period proﬁt rates were
21See Table 22 in Nickell and Layard (1999). This empirical observation is also inconsistent with the
turbulence story told in Marimon and Zilibotti (1999), who model the increase in turbulence as an increase
in the diﬀerence between the most and least productive job a worker could get. As in Ljungqvist and Sargent
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higher in the U.S. than in Europe, but that in the second half of the sample period proﬁt
rates were slightlyhigher in Europe. The observed pattern for proﬁt rates is consistent with
the main hypothesis and a key prediction of this paper. The higher U.S. proﬁt rates are
consistent with higher surplus values which ensured that jobs in the U.S. were less sensitive
to decreases in the growth rate and increases in the tax and interest rate.22 Moreover, the
increase of the proﬁts rate in Europe relative to the U.S. is consistent with the property
of our model that a deterioration of the economic environment destroys the less productive
jobs in Europe but not in the U.S..
For a serious investigation about the quantitative importance of the mechanism proposed
in this paper, however, one would need to know much more detailed information about the
cross-sectional distribution of surplus levels than just observed averages. In particular, one
would have to know detailed information about that part of the distribution of z close to
the breakup level. Our hypothesis is that because of the higher replacement rate, there were
more jobs close to breaking up during the sixties in Europe than in the U.S.. The model with
turbulence makes it clear that even perfect knowledge of the cross-sectional distribution of
existing jobs is not always enough to make model predictions. We saw, for example, that an
increase in turbulence lowers the zero surplus level and one could not predict the additional
mass of jobs created because these jobs never existed before.
Time-series information on several other variables, like job creation and job destruction,
has onlylimited information to support or contradict the explanations pr oposed in this paper.
In particular, our theoryoﬀers no prediction for steadystate destruction rates. Our theory
makes predictions for the destruction rate conditional on the skill level. That is, for each skill
22In the model, higher proﬁt rates can be due to higher values of z and to lower unemployment beneﬁts
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level, the destruction rate should go up more in economies with high replacement rates. But
because of composition eﬀects, aggregate destruction rates could either decrease or increase.
For example, it is possible that in the seventies a large number of low-productivity, high-
destruction-rate jobs were destroyed in Europe and never again created. This would increase
the productivityof the remaining jobs and lower the average destruction rate. Moreover,
although job protection seems to have oﬀsetting eﬀects on average unemployment rates, it
can have important eﬀects on average job destruction and job creation rates and could also
be important to understand business cycle properties of unemployment rates.
4.5. Related Literature. There are several other papers that studythe relationship
between growth and steady-state unemployment rates. A key issue is whether technological
progress is modelled as embodied or disembodied technological progress. We follow Pissarides
(1990) and model growth as disembodied technological progress, while Aghion and Howitt
(1994) model growth as embodied technological progress. In Aghion and Howitt (1994) a
relationship can onlybeneﬁt from new technologybysevering the relationship, going to
the matching market, and getting newlymatched. We argue that embodied technological
progress is a sensible approach for capital and investment but less so for labor market models.
Note that in Aghion and Howitt (1994) a worker who was part of a relationship that was
severed because of a low productivity level (relative to the newly available technology), will
actuallybe capable of using the newest technology , but onlyafter having been unemploy ed
for some time. We argue that it makes more sense to let existing relationships incorporate
new technologies. Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) generalize Aghion and Howitt (1994) by
allowing existing relationship to upgrade to the newest available technologybypay ing an
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should be lower for an existing ﬁrm then for a new relationship.23 This implies that ﬁrms
would never break up to obtain the new technologybut rather would continue the existing
relationship and paythe upgrade cost.
This issue is important because with embodied technological progress (allowing vacancy
costs to rise at the same rate as the productivityof new matches), an increase in growth
actuallyincreases unemploy ment. 24 The reason is that higher growth causes existing re-
lationships to become obsolete faster and, thus, to break up faster. This idea is used by
Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2000) to argue that an increase in embodied technological
progress that started in the 1970’s increased unemployment in those countries with high un-
employment beneﬁts. The story we propose in this paper is more straightforward, but we are
sympathetic to the idea that in some sectors embodied technological progress is important
and has increased unemployment in the last few decades.
The role of taxes is studied in detail byDaveri and Tabellini (2000). Their p aper docu-
ments the eﬀect of taxes on unemployment rates and growth rates and builds an overlapping-
generations model with endogenous growth to explain the empirical ﬁndings. Note that
whereas we consider changes in tax rates and growth rates as two independent shocks, Dav-
eri and Tabellini (2000) argue that the cause of the lower growth rates actuallyis high tax
rates. The ﬁnding that tax rates aﬀect growth is disputed in the literature,25 but Daveri and
Tabellini argue that one does ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects if one exploits both the cross-sectional
and time series variation of the data and distinguishes among countries on the basis of their
labor market institutions.
23Our model basically assumes that the upgrade costs are equal to zero.
24See Aghion and Howitt (1994) and Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2000).
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5. C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
We have reassessed the European unemployment puzzle using a job matching model that
features endogenous job creation and destruction, bilateral wage bargaining, and variable
worker skill levels that mayrise on the job. The model considers shocks in the form of slower
growth, higher interest rates, higher tax rates, and increased turbulence, and studies how
these shocks interact with the replacement rate and the initial tax rate level. The variability
of relation-speciﬁc productivityis also consi dered. Slower growth, higher interest rates, and
higher tax rates are shown to induce a larger increase in unemployment when the replacement
rate or the initial tax rate is higher, as was found empiricallybyBlanchard and Wolfers (2000)
and Daveri and Tabellini (2000). Higher turbulence actuallyreduces unemploy ment, due to
exerting a favorable eﬀect on job destruction; this reverses the ﬁnding of Ljungqvist and
Sargent (1998).
An important implication of our results is that the European unemployment problem
should not be viewed as self-correcting. The model demonstrates that slower growth and
higher interest rates produce greater unemployment, especiallyin the presence of ge nerous
unemployment beneﬁts. Unless the shocks are reversed, or other institutional changes are
made, unemployment may be expected to remain high.
This paper documents the importance of the cross-sectional distribution of the surplus,
especiallyabout that part of the distribution where relationships are close to breaking up.
The keyhy pothesis in this paper is that the mass of jobs that were close to breaking up was
substantiallyhigher in Europe because of high tax rates and high outside beneﬁts. The ideal
data set to test the explanation given in this paper would be a surveyheld in the sixties that
asked ﬁrms and workers in the U.S. and Europe how close theywere to breaking up. The
historical proﬁt rates discussed in Section 4.1 support the view that a smaller share of jobsSHOCKS AND INSTITUTIONS IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 36
were close to breaking up in the U.S. than in Europe, but a serious quantitative assessment
of the mechanism described in this paper would require much more detailed information
about the cross-sectional distribution in the sixties.
6. A￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
In the appendix we discuss details about the data sources and diﬀerent types of relationships
in the model.
Data Sources. The tax data reported in Figure 3 are from Daveri and Tabellini (2000).
The net-proﬁt rates in manufacturing are from Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison (1991). All
other data were provided to us byJustin Wolfers and we refer the reader for a more de-
tailed description of these data to the data appendix of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) that
is available at http://web.mit.edu/blanchar/www/harry_data/. Data for standardized un-
employment rates and durations are from the Quarterly Labor Force Statistics. The OECD
replacement rates are from the OECD’s database on Unemployment Beneﬁt Entitlements
and Replacement Rates. These numbers are based on an average over three family types,
two income levels, and seven unemployment duration levels. The real interest rate is the
nominal interest rate on long-term government securities less the annualized rate of inﬂation
over the last ﬁve years using the GDP deﬂator. Finally, total factor productivity is the Solow
Residual in the business sector, scaled bythe labor share.
Types of Workers. Given tax rates and values for b one onlyneeds to know the frac-
tion of low-skilled workers, the fraction of high-skilled workers, the fraction of (low-skilled)
unemployed not entitled to unemployment beneﬁts, the fraction of low-skilled unemployed
entitled to bl, the fraction of low-skilled unemployed entitled to bh, and the fraction of high-
skilled unemployed. To calculate average wages (which in turn determine unemploymentSHOCKS AND INSTITUTIONS IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 37
beneﬁts) and tax rates a more precise disaggregation is needed. In Table 8 we report all the
diﬀerent types of workers their outside option or unemployment beneﬁts and if applicable
the values of z at which theyoperate.SHOCKS AND INSTITUTIONS IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 38
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Figure 1: Standardized unemployment rates
Note: Data are described in the appendix.
Figure 2: OECD replacement ratio
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Figure 3: Effective tax rate
Note: Data are from Daveri and Tabellini (2000).
Figure 4: Total factor productivity growth
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Figure 5: Real interest rate
Note: Data are described in the appendix.
Figure 6: Transformed discount factor
Note: This graph plots (1+x)/(1+r), where x is the TFP growth rate of Figure 4 and r is the interest rate of Figure 5. For each country
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Figure 7: Effect of decrease in TFP growth on rejection and destruction margin
z(b) z¢(b) z





Figure 8: A Decrease in b and the effect of replacement rates on zero-surplus margin
(identical cross-sectional distributions)
Figure 9: A Decrease in b and the effect of replacement rates on zero-surplus margin
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Figure 10: Manufacturing Net-Profit Rate
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Table 1: Benefit measures (1989-1994)







Source: Nickell and Layard (1999, p. 3045).












Table 3: Equilibrium unemployment rates and decreases in the discount factor
Part A: Benchmark specification




factor b b b b
0.99 4.97 4.97
Note: Here f is the replacement rate and the values of other parameters are given in Table 2.
Part B: Alternative Specifications
f f f f =0 . 5 f f f f =0 . 3
l l l l
w =0 . 3 l l l l
w =0 . 5
r r r r
x =0
s s s s
z =2 . 4 3
r r r r
x=1.05%
s s s s
z =2 . 4 3
r r r r
x =0
s s s s
z =3 . 1 8
r r r r
x =0
s s s s
z =2 . 0 4
0.97 6.75 4.97 7.85 5.71
0.98 5.75 4.97 6.24 5.35
discount
factor b b b b
0.99 5.01 4.97 4.99 5.01
Note: Here f is the replacement rate, l
w is the matching probability, r
x is the rate of exogenous breakups,
and s
z is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic productivity shock. The values of other parameters are
given in Table 2. In all economies the parameters are chosen such that the unemployment rate is approximately 5%
when b = 0.99. In the first column this is done by adjusting s
z.T h e ni nc o l u m n2t h ev a l u eo fr
x is increased to again get a 5%
unemployment rate at the lower value of f. In the third and fourth column the value of s
z is used to get a 5% unemployment rate at the
indicated matching probability.49
Table 4: Equilibrium unemployment rates and increases in the tax rate
Part A: Low initial tax rates
government expenditure z z z z
0.0 0.025 0.05
0.97 6.75 7.63 8.78
0.98 5.75 6.43 7.34
discount
factor b b b b
0.99 5.01 5.54 6.24
Note: The value of f = 0.5. The value of sz = 2.43 which insured that the
unemployment rate was approximately equal to 5% when z =0a n db = 0.99.
The other parameter values are given in Table 2.
Part B: High Initial Tax Rates
government expenditure z z z z
0.10 0.125 0.15
0.97 6.75 8.19 10.52
0.98 5.76 6.88 8.73
discount
factor b b b b
0.99 5.03 5.89 7.32
Note: The value of f = 0.5. The value of sz = 2.32 which insured that the
unemployment rate was approximately equal to 5% when z =0a n db = 0.99.
The other parameter values are given in Table 2.









Table 6: Equilibrium Unemployment with all shocks
Part A: Replacement rate f = 0.5 & upgrade probability g
U =0 . 1 5
discount factor b b b b
0.97 0.98 0.99
0.0 28.7 26.9 25.1
0.05 20.9 17.0 12.6
0.1 14.4 8.8 5.0
downgrade
probability
g g g g
D
0.15 8.0 4.0 2.7
Note: The value of r
x = 0 and the value of s
z= 3.81. The values of other parameters are given in Table 5.
Thevalueofs
z is chosen in such a way that the unemployment rate is approximately equal to 5% when
b =0 . 9 9a n dg
D =0 . 1 .
B: Replacement Rate f = 0.3 & upgrade probability g
U =0 . 1 5
discount factor b b b b
0.97 0.98 0.99
0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
0.05 5.0 5.0 5.0
0.1 5.0 5.0 5.0
downgrade
probability
g g g g
D
0.15 5.0 5.0 5.0
Note: The value of s
z= 3.81 as in part A and the value ofr
x = 0.0106. The values ofother parameters are given in Table 5.
Thevalueofr
x is chosen in such a way that the unemployment rate is approximately equal to 5% when
b =0 . 9 9a n dg
D =0 . 1 .51
C: Replacement Rate f = 0.5 & upgrade probability g
U =0 . 1
discount factor b b b b
0.97 0.98 0.99
0.0 34.5 33.0 31.2
0.05 27.7 23.9 18.5
0.1 23.2 16.3 5.01
downgrade
probability
g g g g
D
0.15 18.5 4.23 3.91
Note: The value of r
x = 0 and the value of s
z= 4.051. The values ofother parameters are given in Table 5.
Thevalueofs
z is chosen in such a way that the unemployment rate is approximately equal to 5% when
b =0 . 9 9a n dg
D =0 . 1 .
D: Replacement Rate f = 0.3 & upgrade probability g
U =0 . 1
discount factor b b b b
0.97 0.98 0.99
0.0 9.6 7.8 6.4
0.05 5.4 5.1 4.8
0.1 5.6 5.3 5.0
downgrade
probability
g g g g
D
0.15 5.7 5.4 5.1
Note: The value of s
z= 4.051 as in part A and the value of r
x = 0.0098. The values ofother parameters are given in Table 5.
Thevalueofr
x is chosen in such a way that the unemployment rate is approximately equal to 5% when
b =0 . 9 9a n dg
D =0 . 1 .52
Table 7: Equilibrium Unemployment with all shocks
(Mortensen & Pissarides type increase in turbulence)
discount factor b b b b
0.97 0.98 0.99
2.83 8.75 5.11 3.32
2.91 14.36 8.77 5.01
cross-sectional
standard
deviation s s s sz 2.99 19.72 14.37 8.39
Note: Here r
x =0 ,f =0 . 5 ,a n dg
D = 0. The values of other parameters are given in Table 5.
Table 8: Different types of agents in model with turbulence
Part A: Unemployed workers
skill level unemployment benefit
New labor market entrant low 0
Formerly low-skilled worker low bl
Downgraded high-skilled worker low bh
Formerly high-skilled worker high bl
Part B: Employed workers
outside option range of z values
Young low skilled who accept job to become
Eligible for unemployement benefit
wl(0) [zl(0),zl(bl)]
Low-skilled worker, formerly entitled to bh,
in 1
st period of employment
bh + wl(bh) [zl(bh),µ]
Low-skilled worker, formerly entitled to bh,
after 1
st period of employment
bl + wl(bl) [zl(bh),µ]
Other low skilled workers bl + wl(bl) [zl(bl),µ]
High-skilled worker who just got upgraded bl + wl(bl) [zh(bh),µ]
Other high-skilled workers bh + wh(bh) [zh(bh),µ]